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Abstract: Establishing a credible and effective transparency system will be both crucial and challenging 
for the climate regime based on the pledge and review process established in the Paris Agreement. 
The Agreement provides for review of achievements under national pledges (Nationally Determined 
Contributions, or NDCs), but much of this information will become available only well after key steps in the 
launch of this latest attempt to control human influence on the climate. Still, in these early years, information 
and understanding of individual and collective performance, and of relative national burdens under the 
NDCs, will play an important role in the success or failure of the Agreement. However, because of the 
phasing of various steps in the 5-year cycles under the Agreement and the unavoidable delays of two or more 
years to produce and review government reports, the Climate Convention and other intergovernmental 
institutions are ill-suited to carry out timely analyses of progress. Consequently, in advance of formal 
procedures, academic and other non-governmental groups are going to provide analyses based on available 
data and their own methodologies. We explore this transparency challenge, using the MIT Economic 
Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, to construct sample analyses, and consider ways that efforts 
outside official channels can make an effective contribution to the success of the Agreement.
1  Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massacusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
2  Corresponding Author (Email: hjacoby@mit.edu)
3  Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, USA
1. LAUNCHING A NEW CLIMATE REGIME ..............................................................................................................2
1.1 THe rOLe OF TraNSPareNCY .....................................................................................................................................2
1.2 THe TIMING OF INITIaL CYCLeS, rePOrTING GuIDeLINeS aND STOCKTaKeS .........................................3
1.3 uSING eCONOMIC MODeLS TO INFOrM THe TraNSPareNCY PrOCeSS ...................................................5
2. PROVIDING TRANSPARENCY ................................................................................................................................6
2.1 INDIVIDuaL PerFOrMaNCe ...........................................................................................................................................6
2.2 aGGreGaTe aCHIeVeMeNT ........................................................................................................................................... 7
2.3 COMParaBILITY aND reLaTIVe eFFOrT ..................................................................................................................8
3. ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................11
4. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................... 12
APPENDIX A. THE MIT EPPA MODEL .................................................................................................................... 14
APPENDIX B. NDCS AND POLICIES AND MEASURES ...................................................................................... 15
B.1 FIrST NDCS ........................................................................................................................................................................15
B.2 eXPeCTeD POLICIeS aND MeaSureS .....................................................................................................................15
B.2.1 electric Power ................................................................................................................................................16
B.2.2 Transport ........................................................................................................................................................16
APPENDIX B REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................17
1. Launching A New Climate Regime
To be effective, the international process cannot afford to 
repeat the experience of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, where 
many years were spent trying to implement its legal-
ly-binding, limited national emission targets. Kyoto was 
essentially thrown aside in in 2009, when the 15th meeting 
of the Conference of Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC 
established a new, more universal approach, the Copen-
hagen Accord, based on voluntary pledges and reviews 
of performance. It has taken another six years to agree 
on a formal, global realization of the new regime in the 
Paris Agreement, reached at COP 21 in 2015.1 Signifi-
cant disagreements remain unresolved, e.g., concerning 
finance and how common but differentiated responsi-
bilities (CBDR) will manifest, and key procedures and 
guidelines are still under negotiation. Moreover, it is 
argued that a regime based on pledge and review can-
not in any case meet the challenging, long-term objec-
tives of the Agreement (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2016; 
Nordhaus, 2016). It is, nonetheless, the system we now 
have—perhaps the best possible given the nature of the 
problem (Keohane and Victor, 2016)—so nations have 
every incentive to gain the maximum results from it. Ef-
fectiveness in the early years in building the “rulebook” 
and procedures, and, even more, in achieving emissions 
reductions, will determine whether another long peri-
od of years will be spent in frustration, trying to reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions by this approach. Here 
we focus on one component of the Paris Agreement that 
will be important in determining its success: review of 
performance or what the Agreement calls “transparency” 
in the process to undertake, report on, review and renew 
national pledges.
The Agreement covers many aspects of the global climate 
effort, including adaptation to a changing climate, capac-
ity development in lower income countries, technology 
transfer, and diverse forms of financial aid. Its Article 4 
(Mitigation) describes the process for voluntary emis-
sions pledges, termed Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDCs). 
In the run-up to Paris, nations were asked to declare their 
Intended NDC (INDC), and, by the start of the meeting, 
over 190 nations had done so—bringing essentially the 
whole globe into a mitigation regime for the first time. 
Most of these INDCs are being submitted, unchanged, 
as the first NDCs. As they join, each nation declares its 
NDC of emissions reduction and other actions, extending 
1  For the history of the path to Paris and its current provisions 
see Flannery (2015) and Bodansky (2016). The Paris Agreement is 
available at http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/
application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf. The accompanying 
decision text, elaborating steps to implementation, is at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
through the period ten years ahead. This initial pledge is 
the first of a series, renewed in five-year cycles, wherein 
nations are expected to increase their mitigation effort 
with each cycle. Although negotiators anticipated that 
the Agreement would not take effect long before 2020, by 
October 2016 the required level of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession (55 nations, representing at least 
55% of global greenhouse emissions) had been achieved, 
and the Agreement entered into force 4 November 2016. 
Most nations stated their INDCs in terms of a 2030 goal, 
though several (including the U.S.) chose target dates of 
2025. In 2020 all Nations will submit or provide updated 
pledges for the second cycle, through 2030.
Developed nations pledge economy-wide, absolute emis-
sions reduction targets (similar to those in the Kyoto 
Protocol—though lacking the legal obligation to meet 
them). All have done so, though not all with the same 
base year or accompanying information. Developing na-
tions are free to state their “contributions” in whatever 
form they feel to be appropriate, given their particular 
national circumstances. Their INDCs take many forms. 
Most state their contributions in terms of the Kyoto bas-
ket of greenhouse gases, but some pledge reductions in 
CO2 only. Some pledge a reduction in emissions intensity 
(e.g., tons per dollar of GDP) below a base year, but a 
large number frame their INDCs as a reduction relative 
to a business-as-usual projection of national emissions. 
For example, China pledged that, in addition to meeting 
a CO2-only intensity target, its CO2 emissions will peak 
“around 2030”, but it has not specified the height of the 
peak. Finally, a number of parties pledge to undertake 
specific policy measures, not an overall national target. 
Flexibility to accommodate domestic conditions made 
agreement in Paris possible, but makes it challenging to 
construct a clear picture of the individual INDCs, antici-
pate collective achievement across the entire portfolio of 
INDCs, or evaluate the relative effort of various parties.
1.1 The Role of Transparency
“Transparency” is a procedural term used in the Paris 
text that absorbs tasks and controversies that in previous 
climate discussions fell under the heading of monitoring, 
reporting and verification, or MRV (Singh et al., 2016). 
All international agreements involve some system of 
MRV and, in a pledge and review regime as established in 
Paris, MRV provisions serve many important functions 
(Wiener, 2015). Two among these are most important 
for this discussion: revealing the performance of the in-
dividual parties (i.e., through reports and reviews), and 
assessing the aggregate achievement of the pledges in re-
ducing global emissions. The Paris Agreement contains 
provisions for both, but precisely how they will be imple-
mented remains a matter of negotiation.
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The expectation is that the transparency processes in the 
Agreement will take effect in the period after 2020. The 
new procedures will build from and enhance existing 
procedures now in effect. For now, parties operate under 
reporting and review procedures established at COP 16 
and COP 17 to monitor progress under the Copenhagen 
Accord. These consist of biennial national reports for 
Annex 1 parties (developed nations), with a review pro-
cess of international assessment and review; and biennial 
update reports for most non-Annex 1 parties, with a re-
view process of international consultation and analysis. 
Differing approaches, with less stringent requirements 
for developing nations, were necessary to reflect CBDR.
The Agreement’s Article 13 establishes a transparency 
framework to track both action and support by parties, 
with flexibility to account for differing national capaci-
ty. The objectives of the framework it establishes include 
the “clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving 
Parties’ individual nationally determined contributions 
under Article 4 [mitigation].” Free riding is a threat to 
such a voluntary regime, giving crucial importance to its 
“review” component. The effort nations put into meet-
ing their first NDCs, and their willingness to take on 
additional reductions in subsequent cycles, will depend 
on credible information about whether others are doing 
what they pledged, and on perceptions of the fairness of 
the relative distribution of burdens. 
The negotiators worked hard to overcome long-standing 
conflicts over MRV2 to provide this information in as 
credible a form as possible. All but the least developed 
countries and small island states (who are given great-
er flexibility) are to report biennially, and each nation’s 
report shall undergo a “technical expert review” and 
be subjected to a “facilitative multilateral consideration 
of progress.” The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA) is to work out details of this review 
process, including development of the modalities, pro-
cedures and guidelines (MPGs) for accounting of the 
NDCs, deciding the content and timing of the reports to 
be submitted by different categories of parties, and estab-
lishing review procedures. 
Though not formally under the heading of “transparency,” 
Article 14 establishes another information process that 
will, in fact, be an essential element of the transparency 
regime. Beginning in 2023, and each five years thereaf-
ter, the parties are to conduct a “global stocktake” where 
they assess their collective progress in achieving various 
provisions of the Agreement, especially progress towards 
long-term goals. The hope is that each stocktake will lead 
the parties to take on greater efforts in their follow-on 
2  For a glimpse as some of the issues, see 
Niederberger and Kimble (2011) and Gupta et al. (2014).
NDCs. Because 2023 is so far in the future, the parties 
also agreed to convene a “facilitative dialog” among the 
parties in 2018, to “take stock” of the collective progress 
of all parties and to inform the preparation of future 
NDCs. Overall, the transparency process aims to demon-
strate effective progress and provide understanding and 
support for more ambitious future pledges.
1.2 The Timing of Initial Cycles, Reporting 
Guidelines and Stocktakes
The rapid pace of events in the next decade creates a 
daunting challenge for the transparency objectives of 
the Paris Agreement. Figure 1 places the launch of the 
Paris Agreement, its pledge cycles and the stocktakes in 
the context of paths to alternative emissions futures. It 
shows a projection of emissions of the various green-
house gases, in CO2 equivalents (CO2-e), in the absence 
of the mitigation effort pledged in the Agreement (this 
projection is inserted to provide baselines for discus-
sion below of measures of national effort). Figure 1 also 
presents our estimate of the achievement expected from 
the NDCs pledged for 2025 and 2030, with a projection 
of contributions to 2040. Actual global emissions from 
2030 forward likely will be lower than this estimate, as 
a result of increased effort in subsequent pledge cycles. 
They will, however, depend on as yet unknown future 
commitments that are the source of concern in this dis-
cussion.3 Of course future emissions may also be affect-
ed (positively or negatively) by unforeseen, indeed un-
knowable developments beyond the purview of analysts 
or economic models (see Section 1.3 and the discussion 
of ex post analyses). 
Also plotted is a cartoon of the emissions path consis-
tent with a longstanding goal of the climate negotiations, 
restated in Paris, of holding the global temperature in-
crease to 2°C. There are many and varied estimates of the 
stringency of emissions reductions needed in the first 
few pledge cycles to put the world on such a path (e.g., 
EC-JRC, 2015; Climate Interactive, 2016; Climate Action 
Tracker, 2015; International Energy Agency, 2015; Jacoby 
and Chen, 2014, 2015; Le Treut et al., 2015; Chen et al., 
2016a; UNEP, 2016). What matters for this discussion is 
that all of these projections presume that a very strong 
increase in mitigation will be achieved in the second and 
subsequent pledge cycles. Indeed, the fate of the new re-
gime likely will be largely determined in this early peri-
od—by pledges to be made in 2020 and 2025.
3  The emissions projections in the figure are made using the MIT 
Economic Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, which 
disaggregates the global economy into twelve of the larger economies 
and six aggregate regions. The EPPA model is described in Appendix 
A. The assumptions underlying our estimate of the expected NDC 
performance of the eighteen regions are provided in Appendix B.
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Transparency will thus be particularly important in the 
initial stages of the Agreement to develop confidence in 
reported numbers and trust—not only among the par-
ties, but also among engaged stakeholders and the public. 
One major challenge of achieving this result is suggested 
by the sequence of events in Figure 1: the crowded timing 
of early events and decisions. COP 22, held in Marrakesh 
in 2016, laid out the APA’s agenda to negotiate guidelines 
for the pledge and review system. Unfortunately, these 
implementation details are not due for completion and 
submission for approval by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment (CMA) until 2018, with first reports by the parties 
under the new system unlikely to appear until after 2020. 
In the meantime, key steps in the Paris launch must be 
successfully accomplished. The second-cycle NDCs, new 
pledges for 2030 (or updates of those NDCs initially set 
through 2030), are to be made in 2020, at which time 
there will be no information on performance under the 
first NDCs and likely only a rough impression of efforts 
undertaken in preparation for them. 
Moreover, the 2023 Global Stocktake, which is to cover 
all aspects of the Agreement, must be carried out several 
years before final reports are available on achievements 
under the first NDCs. The 2018 facilitative dialog, with its 
focus on mitigation, comes in the same year that report-
ing guidelines are to be submitted for adoption by CMA! 
A second challenge is to achieve effective transparen-
cy provisions in these APA negotiations, which must 
confront long-standing disagreements over MRV not 
resolved in the Paris text—especially those related to 
differentiation between developed and developing coun-
tries. The delicacy of the task is suggested by the language 
of the Agreement: the transparency framework is to be 
“implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-puni-
tive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid 
placing undue burden on” developing country parties. 
Among the agenda items assigned to the APA, three are 
relevant to this discussion (APA, 2016a):
Agenda Item 3: Further guidance in relation to the mit-
igation pledges. Negotiations leading to the Paris agree-
ment provided great flexibility to nations stating their IN-
DCs, but now that INDCs are being converted to NDCs, 
additional information is needed to clarify what they 
mean and their underlying assumptions. Absent clarity 
in the NDCs, transparency in judging both national and 
collective performance will not be possible.
Agenda Item 5: Modalities, procedures and guidelines for 
the transparency framework. Agreement is needed on what 
nations are supposed to report, and with what metrics and 
methodologies, on their NDC performance and on what 
schedule, as well as details of technical expert reviews of 
these reports and multilateral consideration of progress. 
Agenda Item 6: Matters related to the global stocktake. 
Agreement must be reached on the purpose and goals of 
these meetings, sources and content for input, and pro-
cedures to be followed. 
Overriding all of these topics is the “undue burden” ques-
tion: the degree of differentiation of reporting and review 
obligations according to the level of national develop-
ment and internal capacity to prepare the required data 
Figure 1. NDCs and Stages of review
rePOrT 308 MIT JOINT PrOGraM ON THe SCIeNCe aND POLICY OF GLOBaL CHaNGe
4
and analysis.4 Also, although one focus in this discussion 
is on national and collective emissions mitigation, an-
other—of major importance to developing countries—
concerns national contributions to adaptation (the APA’s 
Agenda Item 4) and to finance, technology transfer and 
development of capacity.
Agreements reached in the APA negotiations will have a 
substantial effect on the credibility of the pledge-and-re-
view system and thus on the viability of the Paris Agree-
ment, and we explore them further in Section 2. However, 
even with APA success in agreeing to the desired MRV, 
procedures built into the Agreement, plus the lags in re-
port preparation, mean that in the critical early years of 
the Agreement insufficient information will be available 
for timely review of the NDCs of individual parties, and 
of global progress toward long-term goals. The resulting 
demand for transparency will then be filled, for better or 
worse, by analyses carried out largely by groups outside 
the bodies of the Climate Convention and other inter-
governmental organizations—mainly non-governmental 
analysts in NGOs, academia, business, etc. In Section 
3 we explore ways that these efforts can be effective in 
supporting development of the Agreement, especially its 
transparency processes. 
1.3 Using Economic Models to Inform the 
Transparency Process
While a variety of approaches can be applied to support 
the transparency regime, quantitative analyses using cli-
mate and economic models to simulate outcomes will 
be essential to assess NDCs with respect to emissions 
reductions (both national and global), compare national 
efforts, and track progress toward long-term goals. Inte-
grated Assessment Models (IAMs), such as the MIT In-
tegrated Global System Model—and within it the EPPA 
model used in this study—provide a capability to eval-
uate interactions involving multiple sectors, regions, 
technologies and policies. Results from such studies by 
multiple IAM groups have long been an essential feature 
of assessments by national and international bodies, no-
tably IPCC Working Group 3 (IPCC, 2014). 
Typical IAM studies of developments over several de-
cades proceed by simulating: 1) hypothetical reference 
or base cases with only existing policies, and 2) various 
policy interventions designed to mitigate emissions. Be-
cause economic feedbacks and interactions—among do-
mestic sectors, along supply and value chains and across 
borders—are ubiquitous, assessment not only of global, 
4  To aid nations lacking the institutional and technical capability to 
prepare inventories and track progress the Paris Agreement establishes 
a Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT), to be imple-
mented by the Global Environment Facility. See http://www.thegef.
org/topics/capacity-building-initiative-transparency-cbit
but also of domestic outcomes requires consideration of 
the full portfolio of NDCs. Quantitative analysis is nec-
essary to understand not only emissions outcomes but 
also economic, social and environmental implications of 
national NDCs. 
Clearly, IAMs are essential to provide ex ante simulations 
of anticipated domestic and collective results from initial 
NDCs. As well, going forward, they can provide insights to 
help improve transparency processes—illuminating prog-
ress and trends, and aiding in ex post analyses of outcomes. 
For example, these potential contributions include:
Understanding national (I)NDCs: To simulate perfor-
mance, analysts must translate national (I)NDCs into 
quantitative specifications required for model simula-
tions. For example, even for the reference case, this may 
include assumptions for population change, productivity 
gains, GDP and the cost and performance of future tech-
nologies. The intervention case requires detail regarding 
policies to achieve objectives. In many cases this requires 
analysts to supply information not available in the (I)NDC 
itself. A summary of key gaps and their relevance to as-
sessment could be an invaluable input (now and going 
forward) to improve the transparency process over time.
Presenting ex ante projections: Although INDCs come 
in many varieties, once they have been translated into 
quantitative parameters that allow model simulation, re-
sults over time can be exhibited in common formats for 
a wide range of properties. This helps to clarify emissions 
implications and the comparability of national pledges—
for example, they can be displayed using a range of com-
mon base years and provide results for multiple metrics.
Accounting for economy-wide and cross border inter-
actions: IAMs allow quantitative evaluation of interac-
tions that may enhance or interfere with presumed out-
comes based on analysis of single sectors or individual 
nations. These effects include not only direct impacts but 
also those that alter the terms of trade. As described in 
Section 3, these effects can be significant for both mitiga-
tion outcomes and domestic economic impacts. 
Insights into progress and trends and ex post reviews: 
Going forward, it will be important to track progress in 
meeting current NDCs to inform future pledges. IAM 
simulations can evaluate progress using a variety of met-
rics—both those that form the basis for specific national 
pledges and others that provide additional insight regard-
ing comparability of effort. Moreover, reality may play 
out in ways that differ considerably from the assump-
tions that underlay earlier NDCs. For example, emis-
sions may be materially higher or lower than pledged as 
a result of unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances 
such as changes in government, recessions, natural di-
sasters (e.g., tsunamis), and technological advances (e.g., 
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fracked oil and gas). IAM analyses can help to inform 
negotiators and engaged stakeholders sorting out the va-
lidity of eariler assumptions, the effectiveness of policies, 
and the consequences of unanticipated developments. 
Such analyses will be important in forming judgments 
about the ambition and feasibility of future pledges. 
From these perspectives, analyses using quantitative 
models can be useful not only to provide data for use 
within the transparency process, but also to indicate the 
types of upfront accompanying information, reports and 
metrics that could be used to improve the entire process 
going forward.
2. Providing Transparency
Three components of transparency are needed to support 
the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement: credibility 
(reliably describing national performance in mitigation 
and support), effectiveness (in achieving national and ag-
gregate global emissions outcomes), and fairness (regard-
ing relative efforts). Each has its own problems of data, 
definition and analysis that are unlikely to be resolved in 
time to support transparency provisions of the Agreement 
in its crucial early years, illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, 
rather than a process alternating between pledging and 
reviewing outcomes, during the startup phase of the Paris 
Agreement the sequence is pledge (2015 through 2025 or 
2030), pledge (2020 through 2030), pledge (2025 through 
2035), report outcomes (through 2025, in perhaps 2027) 
and then review (2027 or later). The transparency system 
for the most part must be based on reports and reviews of 
progress and trends relative to pledges (rather than out-
comes) and progress toward long-term goals. 
2.1 Individual Performance
In Framework Convention jargon, the task of APA Agen-
da Item 3 is clarification of the “features” of the NDCs. For 
the developed nations, who pledge economy-wide reduc-
tions below the level in a base year, the contribution and 
metrics of performance are clear. But pledges and metrics 
for NDCs involving a reduction below a business-as-usual 
(BAU) projection, a decrease in emissions intensity, or a 
sectoral outcome, frequently leave much to be desired—or, 
in the case of an analyst or input to a model, much to be 
assumed. For example, some NDCs based on a reduction 
below BAU do not include a clearly defined basis for emis-
sions forecasts or the assumptions behind it. Similarly, in-
tensity pledges usually do not specify the future GDP level 
to which the intensity target will apply. Thus, negotiation 
within the APA will attempt to define the elements of a 
clear pledge and an adequate report, e.g., including start-
ing points and future reference values that underlie the 
proposed NDC. For reductions below BAU emissions, in-
clusion of a clearly defined emissions forecast seems an es-
sential requirement of the reporting guidelines. The GDP 
projection underlying an intensity pledge is more contro-
versial. Nations making this pledge prefer the flexibility to 
adjust their contribution to uncertain future growth. Also, 
they perhaps fear that the projection will be used to con-
vert the NDC into an implicit pledge to an absolute emis-
sions goal, like those expected of the developed nations. 
Without these underlying assumptions and projections, of 
course, the estimation of quantitative emissions is left to 
the analyst (of which more later).
Then there is the issue of the guidelines for information 
to track progress with the NDCs (APA Agenda Item 5). 
Inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and sinks will 
build on decades of experience with previous UNFCCC 
reports and methodologies developed by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but ad-
ditional information desired to “track progress” on the 
NDCs is yet to be determined. There are proposals for the 
guidelines to include metrics for progress on policies and 
measures being applied and how they are consistent with 
the NDC, and perhaps with other features of a low-emis-
sions development strategy (e.g., APA, 2016b). On this 
point the negotiations will confront the requirement that 
the procedure must be “non-intrusive” and “respective of 
national sovereignty”—familiar aspects of controversy 
over the ongoing requirement for CBDR in MRV.
In the absence of reliable and timely national reports and 
reviews under the Paris Agreement, outside groups are 
developing frameworks for study and documentation of 
institutional development and policy formation (e.g., Ba-
rua et al., 2014). Much of this effort is intended to inform 
and guide domestic mitigation actions, however, and 
proposed frameworks are too complicated for inclusion 
in studies of aggregate achievement or comparisons of 
effort at the national level. For example, they often distin-
guish policy instruments by greenhouse gas, economic 
sector, and national institutional structure & history, and 
cover multiple stages of formulation: public consulta-
tion, legislation, licensing and permitting, financing and 
implementation, and expected effects. These efforts can 
nonetheless contribute to projections of individual effort 
and likely emissions results and thereby contribute to 
larger transparency challenge. 
Also to be determined in negotiations under APA Agen-
da Item 5 is the timing of the first report under the new 
guidelines. Since the first pledge period begins in 2020 
and runs to 2025, one might expect the first date for an 
interim report to be no earlier than 2022. Experience 
with previous reports under the Framework Convention 
shows that, because of the normal lags in preparing in-
ventories (and other required items, likely to be agreed) 
these reports cannot be expected until many months 
after the close of the report year, perhaps some time in 
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2023 or 2024 for a first report target of 2020. Moreover, 
national reports on performance over the full course of 
the first NDC period would not be available, also indi-
cated in Figure 1, until well over a year after its close in 
2025.5 For the preponderance of pledges stated in terms 
of a 2030 goal, of course, the information on ultimate 
performance under the NDC will come even later.
2.2 Aggregate Achievement
The willingness of nations to take on burdens under the 
Paris pledge and review system will depend not only on 
information about individual performance but also on 
confidence that the effort is producing global results in 
line with achieving long-term goals. As the Agreement 
enters into the years of the first NDC the national inven-
tories will provide some indication of the trajectory of 
national emissions. Unfortunately, as noted above, im-
portant steps in regime implementation must be taken 
before this component of the transparency framework 
will be available to guide the construction of a global pic-
ture. One such event is the 2018 facilitative dialog. It is 
to consider collective progress on emissions mitigation 
in the light of the Agreement’s temperature goals and 
to inform preparation of the next cycle of NDCs. Vari-
ous sources of mitigation information will be available 
to the dialog. The IPCC is undertaking a Special Report 
describing emissions pathways to limit warming to 1.5°C 
and anticipated impacts. Other intergovernmental ef-
forts, like the annual Gap Report prepared by the UN 
Environmental Program (UNEP, 2016) will include a 
summary of emissions projections under the first-cycle 
NDCs. As with past reports by these organizations, how-
ever, these studies will be based mainly on analysis pub-
lished by non-government groups. Also, many studies 
focus primarily on emissions outcomes without provid-
ing insight into economic and social consequences that 
will be essential to judging comparability of effort. 
Unfortunately, as noted above there are significant ques-
tions about how to interpret many of the NDCs for inclu-
sion in forecasting models—issues that may be clarified in 
negotiations by the APA under its Agenda Item 3, but in 
any event not before 2018. When these differences in inter-
pretation and baseline projections are input to forecasting 
models of differing structure and parameter assumptions, 
the result is a wide range of estimates of national and ag-
gregate achievement under the initial NDCs (e.g., UNEP, 
2016; Levin and Fransen, 2015). Several aspects of these 
analyses contribute to variation in results, for example: 
Base year data. Carefully prepared, commonly accepted, 
historical data is available on fossil and industrial CO2 
5  These lags do not consider the additional time required for the 
other two stages in the transparency framework: technical expert 
review and facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.
emissions. There is greater uncertainty about human emis-
sions of methane and the other non-CO2 greenhouse gases, 
but differences in assumptions likely yield only a small dif-
ference among studies in total CO2-equivalent emissions. 
The main problem is land-use emissions of CO2, where es-
timates differ substantially (IPCC, 2014, Chapter 11). 
Economic and Emissions Baselines and Unbounded Pledg-
es. Estimates of emissions of nations pledging a reduc-
tion below a projected emissions path, or in emissions 
intensity, differ in their assumptions about population, 
economic growth, and associated energy use and green-
house emissions. In the later years—for national NDCs, 
and especially for consideration of progress to long-term 
goals—projections will also be sensitive to differing as-
sumptions regarding costs and performance of available 
technologies. Until the reporting guidelines require more 
information on the assumptions underlying the NDCs, 
these essential details will remain uncertain. In addition, 
many pledges do not set a clear bound on emissions. 
Contingent Pledges and Assumed Performance. For many 
developing countries, the NDC is conditioned, often in 
an unclear way, on the provision of financial assistance, 
with limited confidence that it will be forthcoming—this 
uncertainty exacerbated by the lack of clarity, or com-
plete absence of information, on financial commitments 
in the NDCs of developed nations. Also, for some coun-
tries the expected performance must be conditioned on 
uncertain domestic circumstances (e.g., the overall set 
of climate policies of the new US administrations).6 In 
general, estimates by government agencies and interna-
tional groups (e.g., the UN Environment Program and 
International Energy Agency) are constrained to take the 
NDCs at face value, even if the NDC is lacking in specific 
policies to achieve the pledge.
Macroeconomic and Trade Effects. Analysis of most 
pledges—other than those of developed countries—are 
based on projections of national emissions (for pledges 
of reduction below BAU) or GDP (for pledges of cuts 
in intensity). Results differ depending on whether these 
projections account for the economic effects of a nation’s 
own NDC and those of other parties. Emissions out-
comes cannot be established based on pledges or policies 
that deal with only a part of the economy. Economic in-
teractions among domestic sectors and between nations 
are ubiquitous. Consequently, going forward, national 
and global outcomes will require taking account of the 
full domestic and international response to the entire 
portfolio of NDCs, as well as other likely developments 
(e.g., with respect to availability and performance of fu-
ture technologies). As illustrated in Section 2.3, the effects 
6  Several judgments of this type underlie the NDC estimates in 
Appendix B.
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through trade of the actions of others can have a substan-
tial effect on a nation’s economy. For most nations, these 
influences lead to a reduction in economic activity below 
the assumed BAU level, but in some cases, trade effects 
dominate and economic activity increases. Most analy-
ses of aggregate achievement under the Paris pledges are 
based on partial equilibrium studies, nation by nation, 
and ignore the macroeconomic effects. Others, however, 
may attempt to account for them, for example, in project-
ing emissions reduction under an intensity target, which 
could lead to inconsistency among the study definitions. 
Transparency in studies of the expected aggregate per-
formance of the NDCs, and of pledge cycles to come, 
will be increased if parties to the Agreement establish 
clear requirements for the information and assumptions 
that should be contained in national NDCs. Even with 
greater clarity in the NDCs themselves, however, users 
trying to understand the NDCs and their effect on glob-
al emissions will be aided if groups performing analyses 
can agree on assumptions about these inputs where rea-
sonable, and provide clear standards for documentation 
when common assumptions may lead to the loss of valu-
able information. Furthermore, as suggested in Section 
1.3, results from IAM studies and other analyses can 
provide important insight to negotiators and others on 
relevant guidelines for accompanying information to de-
scribe NDCs, and on metrics to measure progress.
2.3 Comparability and Relative Effort
Measures of national effort and comparability of effort 
among nations are not part of the transparency framework 
established in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. Nonethe-
less, these will be critical to inform national decisions re-
garding their willingness to take current NDCs seriously, 
especially those of key nations, and to pursue additional 
effort in subsequent cycles. APA Agenda Item 6, which 
concerns negotiation of plans for the Global Stocktakes 
(to begin in 2023), does not include consideration of mea-
sures of relative effort. Non-state actors are, however, de-
vising indicators to inform the deliberations, e.g., Carbon 
Action Tracker (2016) is assigning grades for the ambi-
tion of different parities. Even closer at hand is the 2018 
facilitative dialog, plans for which are not yet among the 
APA agenda items. Because of apparent sensitivities, the 
presidencies of COP 22 and COP 23 have been tasked to 
undertake consultation on the way forward, with results to 
be presented for consideration at COP 23 in 2017. In the 
interim, studies by unofficial non-governmental analysis 
groups, likely showing a variety of pictures of effort levels, 
will undoubtedly influence that discussion as well. 
Aldy and Pizer (2015) lay out desired features of met-
rics of national effort that will serve the dual function 
of revealing a nation’s effort and providing a basis for 
international comparison: they should be comprehen-
sive (covering a nation’s overall effort), measurable and 
replicable, and universally applicable to all countries. No 
one measure meets all these criteria; clearly a portfolio 
of measures will be needed. Even beyond the difficulties 
created by poor definition of the NDCs puzzles arise in 
constructing these analyses. Applying the MIT EPPA 
model, we illustrate these difficulties and highlight the 
likely disagreements in interpretation of the numbers.7 
To simplify the presentation, we focus on just eight of 
the 18 regions and nations in the EPPA model (Table 1). 
These six nations and two aggregate regions contributed 
just over 60% of global greenhouse emissions in 2015.
Reduction from Baseline & Lowered Intensity. Effort based 
on the reduction below a baseline projection would be 
a sound measure of national effort if there were a stan-
dard, commonly accepted way to construct the emission 
outlook—and, going forward, if the accompanying in-
formation required for that approach was incorporated 
in guidelines to be agreed upon by APA. Moreover, even 
if the guidelines ask for the GDP projection underlying 
an intensity pledge, interpretation of this measure will 
be confounded by the baseline question, as illustrated 
by Figure 2. The figure shows the emissions intensity of 
the eight regions in 2005, and the intensity in 2030 as a 
result of the NDCs of each country or aggregate region.8 
Also shown in the figure is the EPPA model estimate of 
7  The country-by-country results are a product of the particular 
structure of the EPPA model, and parameter values imposed in the 
calculations, so it is not the precise numbers that should be drawn 
from this analysis, but the insights they give regarding the nature of 
challenge in constructing effort measures for individual countries and 
in aggregating expected performance into global projections.
8  The INDCs of China and India are stated in intensity terms, 
Mexico’s is a reduction below a business-as-usual projection, and 












The Middle east region includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
arabia, Syria, uae and Yemen.
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the emissions intensity of each region under the baseline 
(No NDCs) projection in Figure 1. Emissions intensity 
is falling even with no mitigation effort because of the 
continuation of a long-established pattern of greater effi-
ciency of energy and emissions use with time, technolo-
gy change and economic growth.
This natural pattern of intensity change, even without cli-
mate policy, raises the question of what level of intensity 
improvement is appropriate as a measure of individual 
effort for international comparisons. Is it the achieved 
(or projected) level, or the change net of achievement 
that would have come in any case? The latter number 
seems more relevant, but in any case a clear comparison 
requires modeling assumptions about baseline econom-
ic growth and other characteristics of the economy (e.g., 
rates of technology change and efficiency improvement) 
that are consistent across regions.
Emissions Price and Welfare Cost. A logical measure of 
a nation’s mitigation effort is the economic burden im-
posed on its citizens, stated as GDP loss or a reduction in 
some more direct measure of welfare such as equivalent 
variation (a measure of willingness to pay to avoid the 
change) or reduction in personal consumption. In most 
examples of such estimates an economic model is used 
to compute the welfare loss assuming the pledged reduc-
tion is achieved by applying a national price on emissions 
(e.g., Aldy et al., 2016). Figure 3 shows the result of such 
a calculation using the EPPA model. The left-hand panel 
presents the emissions price in 2030, and the right-hand 
panel show the associated welfare loss, measured as the 
percentage reduction in consumption. (Note that, for 
clarity, MEX and MES with higher costs are plotted at a 
different scale. Also, Japan’s cost is effectively zero.) 
The first thing to notice is that emissions price is not a 
good measure of conventional notions of economic bur-
den. Countries have very different economic structures, 
and sensitivity of domestic energy prices to the emissions 
price. Also evident are the effects of international trade 
on the relative percentage welfare burdens of the NDCs. 
The U.S., with a relatively high price, experiences near 
zero welfare loss; India with in effect a zero price sees 
a welfare benefit; and the MES sees the highest welfare 
Figure 2. emissions Intensity, 2005 and 2030, with and without NDCs
Figure 3. CO2-e Price & Welfare Loss to Achieve NDCs, 2030
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loss of all. These seemingly odd outcomes are the result 
of the effect of a global mitigation effort on prices and 
trade volumes of many goods but, most importantly, of 
fossil fuels. Insight into the welfare result in Figure 3 can 
be gained by just noticing which regions are importers of 
oil, gas and coal and which are exporters.
This trade effect can be further illustrated by following 
experiment: what would be the welfare cost if a country 
were acting alone, meeting its NDC while the rest of the 
regions did nothing? Figure  4 shows such an example 
for 2030 using the United States (a net energy importer), 
Mexico (with substantial energy exports) and the Mid-
dle East (where energy exports are a dominant portion 
of GDP). Acting alone, the U.S. would experience a loss 
of roughly ½%, MEX about 1½% and MES ¾%. When 
the rest of the nations take action, the U.S. benefits from 
the effect on its terms of trade, for a welfare gain of about 
¼%, while the nations of the Middle East get hammered. 
The welfare loss in Mexico rises to over 2%, and in the 
Middle East to almost 5%. 
These results raise a caution and a question. First, care 
should be taken with partial equilibrium estimates of the 
cost of NDCs under the Paris Agreement—that is, those 
based on individual country studies that necessarily ig-
nore trade effects. For some countries they do not cor-
rectly estimate the cost.9 And second, which is the correct 
cost-based measure of mitigation effort, the partial equi-
librium measure or the actual impact within the global 
trade system? At the very least, studies of relative effort 
should be transparent as to which measure is being used.
Price Instrument vs. Policies and Measures. An econom-
ic model study that assumes a price-based implementa-
tion of the NDCs does not accurately represent welfare 
cost for most countries. A uniform national price is an 
analysis-facilitating fiction for economic model studies 
that does not reflect the actions most nations are actu-
ally taking to reduce greenhouse emissions. Almost all 
are seeking to meet their NDC reductions with various 
combinations of policies and measures (PAMs). We il-
lustrate the difference between the two approaches with 
our estimate of policies and measures being adopted by 
the eight regions and nations shown above. Many are 
imposing restrictions on coal construction and retiring 
existing plants, imposing wind and solar mandates on 
electric utilities, tightening mileage standards on per-
sonal automobiles, and imposing emissions limits on 
trucks and other commercial transport. We also observe 
that they are implementing efficiency standards on var-
9  Universal analysis of this phenomenon is necessarily limited by 
the fact that general equilibrium economic models that can explore 
trade effects are limited in their level of regional disaggregation, so 
the trade impacts on many countries can only be investigated by their 
position in a group, as with the Middle East in Figure 4. 
ious products and industrial processes. To illustrate the 
welfare effects of PAMs vs a universal emissions price we 
impose just the policies and measures being applied in 
electric generation and transport (details are provided 
in Appendix B). Assuming these policies and measures 
are put into place, Figure 5 shows the resulting national 
welfare cost for 2030, compared with the cost under a 
uniform emissions price, repeated from Figure 4.10 
Not surprisingly, the estimated level of effort is higher with 
the less-efficient policies and measures, as are being imple-
mented in most nations. However, detailed information on 
country PAMs is not available, and some parties may not 
have even yet chosen them. Other PAMs descriptions will 
yield somewhat different results. There is a long history of 
studies showing examples of the much higher cost of meet-
ing a target this way rather than by a uniform price (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1998; Rausch and Karplus, 2014). Increased cost 
will remain, even with better PAMs information. 
Though the policies and measures actually being ap-
plied are the correct basis for constructing this measure 
of national effort, many of the economic models ap-
plied to analysis of the cost of mitigation lack the inter-
nal structure to represent even a rough approximation 
of actual PAMs, and no current model is able to study 
them in their great variation and detail. Also, there is 
an economist’s argument that the effort measure should 
not reward a nation for pursuing the wrong policy.11 So 
10  Another question, not dealt with here, is whether either measure 
of climate-related burden should be corrected for non-climate co-ben-
efits. For example, air pollution control alone can provide a substantial 
justification for China’s NDC (Karplus, 2015; Li et al., 2016).
11  Indeed, one constructive function of studies assuming a uniform 
national emissions price, if compared with analysis of actual policies, 
is to show how great a welfare gain is to be had with an efficient miti-
gation policy.
Figure 4. Trade effects on Welfare, 2030 
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analysis using both policy assumptions—uniform prices 
and PAMs—will be found in studies of effort implied by 
the NDCs. At the very least, transparency should require 
clear documentation of the procedures followed.
3. Enhancing the Transparency 
Framework
The preceding discussion suggests ways that analyses of 
the NDCs by groups besides formal national and inter-
governmental organizations will be important to inform 
transparency, particularly in the early years of the Paris 
Agreement. These groups are likely to continue to pro-
duce and publish analyses of individual and aggregate 
achievement, and estimates of various measures of the 
county effort. Regrettably, there are likely to be confusing 
differences among studies for reasons suggested above: 
differing projections of BAU emissions and GDP projec-
tions, different assumptions about contingent pledges and 
assumed performance, alternative concepts of effort or 
welfare cost, and calculations applying different types of 
economic models.12 Unfortunately, these differences are 
generally not well documented, and there currently is no 
organization that can impose order on the studies where 
it is appropriate, and document the differences where it 
is not.13 This lack of coherence and documentation limits 
the transparency that would aid the Paris launch. 
12  Differences in model structure are another source of variation 
in estimates of mitigation cost. For example, models with less sectoral 
detail, or simpler representation of capital vintaging tend to show 
lower costs (Chen et al., 2016b)
13  Indeed, the focus of many of these efforts is not on these first 
pledges, and the enhancement of transparency but on the emissions 
“gap” to be closed to remain consistent with a 2°C temperature goal 
(e.g., Rogelj et al., 2016). In some cases, these provide information 
only on emissions, with little or no information on economic and so-
cial consequences that will be needed to judge comparability of effort.
It is unlikely that national and intergovernmental or-
ganizations in the climate domain can adequately meet 
this institutional need, and certainly not in time to be 
relevant to the quick pace of events shown in Figure 1. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has played a central role in setting formal guidelines for 
emissions inventories under the UNFCCC. An extension 
of this work into the wider transparency domain is a 
possible route to coherence, and likely essential to advise 
and provide guidelines for the formal process. The IPCC 
would face several barriers with a topic like this, how-
ever. Largely limited to summarizing the peer-reviewed 
literature, the IPCC is not organized to recommend solu-
tions to the types of technical economic questions out-
lined above. Even if it were, the timing is wrong as the 
IPCC’s process involves long lags in initial organization, 
deadlines for consideration of literature, and extensive 
review procedures. Additionally, IPCC is already over-
loaded with studies to be launched (and some complet-
ed) in the next decade.14
Alternatively, a variety of non-governmental organiza-
tions and institutions could provide useful analyses that 
contribute to, inform and improve the overall transparen-
cy process. Though our focus here is on the Paris Agree-
ment, there is a wide range of governmental organizations 
involved in the climate issue (Keohane and Victor, 2010). 
It has been observed that a wide range of functions, in-
cluding governance functions, are being performed by 
informal, non-governmental institutions. Most of these 
14  In addition to the special report on the impacts of 1.5°C warming 
the IPCC is charged with two others: one on Climate Change, Desert-
ification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land Management, Food 
Security and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in the Terrestrial Biosphere, 
another on Climate Change and Oceans and the Biosphere—all to be 
accomplished while producing the 6th Assessment Report, which is 
due ahead of the 2023 Stocktake. 
Figure 5. Welfare Cost of NDCs: Price vs. Policies and Measures (PaMs), 2030
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perform regulatory functions—what Abbott et al. (2016) 
call private transnational regulatory organizations, or 
what Green (2010) terms private entrepreneurial author-
ity. These entities propagate standards for measurement 
and reporting and verification that have come to be ac-
cepted by private, non-profit and governmental enti-
ties—a useful example being the standards prepared by 
the World Resources Institute and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development for measuring and 
reporting greenhouse emissions15, or those developed 
and improved over time by a number of sectoral groups. 
It is possible that existing or new private organizations 
will step up to recommend standards of practice for ex 
ante studies of the NDCs, for analyses of progress and 
trends in performance of actual NDCs, for comparison 
of relative effort, and overall aggregate accomplishments. 
Several existing organizations have the capacity and in-
ternational reach to take on the task. For example, as cit-
ed above, a number of NGOs are active in the domain 
of measurement, reporting, and verification with expe-
rience in collection, reporting and review of domestic 
institutional and policy developments.16 However, many 
lack the internal modeling expertise—such as has charac-
terized groups like the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum 
in managing studies by diverse, international, economic 
modeling groups (e.g., Clarke et al., 2009) or working 
groups of the Integrated Assessment Modeling Consor-
tium17—to organize such an effort. To improve analyses 
of the Paris results these resources need to interact and, 
where appropriate, recommend common approaches for 
15  http://www.ghgprotocol.org
16  Examples include the International Standards Organization and 
its ISO 16064, the World Resources Institute (Singh and Vieweg, 2015) 
and IDDRI (Deprez et al., 2015).
17 http://www.globalchange.edu/iamc
their own analyses. And, while one should not assume 
that it is even possible to design an ideal transparency 
system or economic model of it, such informal, unoffi-
cial approaches and providers can help point the way to 
continuous ongoing improvement in the formal process 
under the Paris Agreement.
The success of a system of pledge-and-review will be 
strongly influenced by the credibility of the transparency 
process. Later in the cycle of NDC updates ex post re-
ports will provide a clear basis to judge actual progress. 
As can be seen in the crowded set of events in Figure 1, 
however, time is short to evolve a widely accepted set 
of standards to help impose some order on the ex ante 
studies, and analyses of early progress and trends, that 
will inform the initial stages of the Paris launch. These 
studies and analyses will be from many sources. To the 
extent they are inconsistent and confusing, or colored by 
advocacy, it will be useful to clarify differences that result 
from varying assumptions and methods, and whether 
they are appropriate. This will help to assure credibility 
to support domestic decisions about current effort and 
more ambitious future pledges. 
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APPENDIX A. The MIT EPPA Model
The MIT Economic Projection and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) model is a multi-region, multi-sector recur-
sive–dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of the world economy (Chen et al., 2016). The 
recursive formulation means that production, consump-
tion, savings and investment are determined by current 
prices. The model is comprised of eighteen nations and 
multination regions shown in Table A1, and it includes 
the effects of international trade among the regions in 
both energy and non-energy goods and services.
EPPA is built on the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) data set of world economic activity, augmented 
by data on greenhouse gases, aerosols and other relevant 
emissions, and details of selected economic sectors. The 
model is used to project economic variables (e.g., gross 
domestic product, energy use, sectoral output, consump-
tion), and emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) and other air pollutants (CO, 
VOC, NOx, SO2, NH3, black carbon and organic carbon) 
from the supply and combustion of carbon-based fuels, 
industrial processes, waste handling and agricultural 
activities. 
As summarized in Table A2, the model identifies a set of 
energy and non-energy sectors that produce goods and 
services and their inter-sector trade, and the sectors that 
consume final goods and services (not shown). Technol-
ogy options in energy production and conversion are 
represented in detail, as also shown in the table. 
Table A1. The eighteen ePPa regions.
Developed Other G20 Aggregations
ANZ Australia-New Zealand BRA Brazil AFR Africa
CAN Canada CHN China ASI East Asia
EUR E.U.+ IND India ROE E. Europe & Central Asia
JPN Japan IDZ Indonesia LAM Latin America
USA United States MEX Mexico MES Middle East
RUS Russia REA Rest of Asia
KOR South Korea
Table A2. Sectors and energy Technologies in the ePPa Model.
Sectors Technology Options
Agriculture - Crops First Generation Biofuels
Agriculture - Livestock Second Generation Biofuels
Agriculture - Forestry Oil Shale
Food Products Synthetic Gas from Coal
Coal Hydrogen
Crude Oil Advanced Nuclear
Refined Oil IGCC with CCS
Natural Gas NGCC
Electricity NGCC with CCS
Energy-Intensive Industries Wind
Other Industries Bio-electricity
Ownership of Dwellings Wind with Bio-electricity
Services Wind with Gas-fired Power
Commercial Transport Solar Generation
Personal transportation is broken out within household final demand and the model considers vintages of internal combus-
tion engine (ICe) vehicles and the change in efficiency standards over time. The one low-emission alternative to the ICe is 
an electric vehicle.
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APPENDIX B. NDCs and Policies and Measures
B.1 First NDCs
The 2030 emissions underlying the projection of the first 
NDCs (see Figure 1) are based on INDCs submitted to 
the Framework Convention website (UNFCCC, 2016) 
and summarized in Table  B1. Adjustment of national 
and regional emissions from the No-NDC projection be-
gin in many countries in 2020, and behavior under the 
first NDCs is extended to 2040. The first NDC projec-
tion does include additional contributions to emissions 
reduction that may be pledged in subsequent rounds of 
the Paris Agreement’s 5-year cycles.
B.2 Expected Policies and Measures
Many countries are applying emissions prices to some 
regions or sectors as part of their mitigation effort, but 
none applies a uniform emissions price across all sources 
Table B1. INDCs and assumed Performance in 2030
Region
INDC1
CO2-e 2005 Mt 
or t/$1000 Other Features
Expected 
CO2-e2Type/Base Reduction   by year
USA ABS 2005  26–28% by 2025 6220 25%3
EUR ABS 1990  40% by 2030 5370 (1990) 27% renewables in electricity by 2040 40%
CAN ABS 2005  30% by 2030 789 Mainly land use & forestry with 18% reduction in industrial 25%
JPN ABS 2005  25% by 2030 1260 2.5% LUCF. Nuclear = 20–22% of electric, solar/wind = 9%, also biomass. Assumes ITMOs. Target = 1.04b ton CO2-e 20%
4
ANZ ABS 2005  26–28% by 2030 596 20%5
BRA ABS 2005  37% by 2025 2.19 45% of primary energy renewable by 2030;  LUCF down 41% 2005–12 35%
CHN CO2 INT 2005  60–65% by 2030 2.55
INDC is CO2 only, discount to account for other gases. 
CO2 peak by 2030, Non-fossil 20% of primary energy 55%
KOR BAU  37% by 2030 NA PAMs on renewables and autos (no detail) 25%
IND INT 2005  30–36% by 2030 2.29 2.5-3.0b tons CO2 from forests. 40% non-fossil electric. 
Assumes un-specified financial assistance
30%
IDZ BAU  29% by 2030 NA Role of LUCF (63% of current emissions) not clear. Industrial emissions increase 30%
MEX BAU  25% by 2030 NA 22% of CO2, 51% of BC,  Intensity reduction of 40% 2013–2030 25%
RUS ABS 1990  25–30% by 2030 3530 Reduction subject to “maximum accounting” from forests 32%
ASI BAU NA Malaysia 45% INT, Philippines 70% BAU,  Thailand 20% BAU, Singapore ABS 36%. 10%
AFR BAU NA Nigeria 45% BAU, South Africa 20-80% increase (ABS), limited information on other regions. 5%
MES BAU NA Saudi & Kuwait actions only, Iran 15% BAU,  UAE non-GHG actions 10%
LAM BAU NA Argentina 15% BAU, Chile 35% INT,  Peru 20% BAU, Colombia 20% BAU 10%
REA BAU NA
Bangladesh 5% BAU, Pakistan reduction after 
unspecified peak, Sri Lanka 7% BAU,  
Myanmar & Nepal miscellaneous actions
10%
ROE BAU NA Azerbaijan 13% BAU, Kazakhstan 15% 1990,  Turkey 21% BAU, Ukraine 40% BAU 10%
1  Sources include uNFCCC (2016) and CaT (2016).
2  Percentage applies to the particular target in column 2.
3  Based on assessments by Greenblatt and Wei (2016), Larsen et al. (2016) and Vine (2016).
4  Discounts ITMOs and nuclear expectations.
5  expectation discounted by political reversals in australia.
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as assumed in the estimate of welfare cost in Figure  4. 
Examples of the partial use of a price instrument include 
the U.S., where emission prices cover some sources in 
California and the RGGI states; the EU, where the ETS 
convers electric power and certain industry sources; and 
Canada, where some provinces have applied emissions 
taxes. However, even where emissions prices are being 
implemented, these countries also continue to apply reg-
ulatory and subsidy policies, driving up the overall wel-
fare cost of the mitigation effort. 
To get a preliminary estimate of the true cost of NDCs in 
this circumstance we assume an emissions price remains 
in effect, but impose the expected policies and measures 
(PAMs)—many of which have marginal costs higher 
than the emissions price that will meet the NDC without 
them. The focus is on measures in the largest emitting 
sectors: electric power and transportation. The PAMs 
satisfy some of each national pledge, but the overall NDC 
reduction is left in place as a constraint, to insure that 
the original pledge is always met, which yields an implied 
residual national emissions price (now much reduced). 
Estimation of the full welfare cost of the current predom-
inance of PAMs in emissions mitigation would impose 
the prices actually in place country by country, and (as is 
actually the case in most places) impose other measures 
one on top of another until the full targeted reduction is 
met. This procedure, which is beyond our current mod-
eling capability, would yield a higher welfare burden than 
the simpler calculation applied here. 
B.2.1 Electric Power
The electric power sector is the largest single source of 
greenhouse gas emissions globally, as well as in most in-
dividual countries. Many forms of policy and different 
control measures are applied to this industry, but the 
most significant in terms of emissions reduction and cost 
are driving out coal and promoting renewables. 
Coal-Fired Generation. Many nations are imposing pol-
icies that include the closing of existing coal-fired gen-
eration. Using a data set that includes all coal-fired units 
(Platts, 2016) for USA, CAN, EUR, JPN and MEX, it is 
assumed that no new units will be added after 2015 in 
these countries, and that existing capacity will be retired 
at age 60. The resulting reduction 2025 to 2030 is shown 
in Table B2; results indicate the advanced age of the coal 
fleet, particularly in the USA and EUR. China pledges to 
cap coal use “around” 2030. No PAMs directed at coal 
use in electric generation are assumed in IND and MES.
Renewable Energy Policies. Many countries are promot-
ing solar and wind generation, by renewable energy 
mandates and various forms of subsidy, and many parties 
state these measures in their INDCs. Renewable sources 
of generation that are receiving policy attention include 
hydroelectric sources, biofuels and tidal and wave power, 
but the main focus is on solar and wind. We apply infor-
mation about these plans as submitted to the Conven-
tion website (UNFCCC, 2016), and summaries by others 
(Chatterton and Du Reitz, 2015), to estimate the scale 
of these policies and measures for the eight subject re-
gions. Their contribution to total generation is plotted in 
Figure B1. The projection takes account only of expected 
installations to 2030 on the assumption that any further 
wind and solar expansion would be achieved only under 
an enhanced effort in the second and subsequent NDCs.
B.2.2 Transport
Light-Duty Vehicles. PAMs in the light duty vehicle sector 
are generally applied in the form of efficiency standards 
for new vehicle sales. Assumed PAMs, stated as a re-
duction (in gasoline-equivalent terms) in l/km from the 
2015 level, are shown in Figure B1. The estimates draw 
on summaries by ICCT (2015a, 2015b) and assume 75% 
passenger cars and 25% light trucks (SUVs). Based on 
analysis by Heywood and MacKensie (2015) national ef-
ficiency targets for 2022 and 2025 are assumed to be met 










CHN NA Cap 2035 & 2040 at 
the 2030 level
IND NA No coal constraint
MEX 30
MES NA No coal constraint
 
Figure B1. Minimum Levels of Wind and Solar Generation
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only by 2030, to account for the difference between mea-
surement procedures for new vehicles and on-the-road 
performance. No further tightening of these standards 
after 2030, though additional improvement may accom-
pany the second and subsequent NDCs.
Commercial Transport. Most countries impose efficiency 
standards on heavy-duty trucks, and on other sectors of 
commercial transport. Trucks dominate energy use and 
emissions in commercial transport, representing toughly 
⅔ of the total. Here, the U.S. truck standards are used 
as the basis for PAMs in this sector (ICCT, 2016). Both 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 standards are imposed in USA, 
CAN, EUR, JPN and CHN, but only the Phase 1 stan-
dards are assumed to be applied in IND, MEX and MES 
(ICCT, 2016).
It is assumed that reduction measures are taken as well in 
the ⅓ represented by air, rail and shipping, but that the 
reduction is only one-half of that achieved in trucking. 
The PAM is applied as a constraint on energy input to 
commercial transport (essentially refined oil).
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